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Chapter 1
Introduction
A shared calendar enables a user to share his calendar events only with some selected user(s) in
the group to whom he wants to. In order to avoid a single point of failure, the shared calendar
should not depend on a central entity. A centralized shared calendar will no more work if the
central entity is down and all participating users will be affected by it instantly. A decentralized
shared calendar provides far better fault tolerance as compared to its centralized counterpart.
An attacker trying to stop functioning the decentralized shared calendar will only be able to
do so if he can successfully perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack on all users of the shared
calendar. On the other hand, it will take less efforts by an attacker in case of centralized shared
calendar as he has to hijack only central entity on which centralized shared calendar depends.
Also, Decentralized Shared Calendar provides support for Ad-Hoc networks (802.11 networks)
and there is low overhead as the tasks are distributed equally among all peers. Considering the
usefulness of such a decentralized shared calendar, DeSCal is proposed in [AIR11].
About DeSCal
DeSCal (abbreviation of Decentralized Shared Calendar for P2P and Ad-Hoc Networks) is a
shared calendar application which provides users a decentralized infrastructure to share1 their
calendar events. All users are allowed to insert a new event in the DeSCal and a user who
inserts a new event is the administrator/owner of this event. A user can always ‘Read’, ‘Delete’
and ‘Edit’ the events which he administrates/owns and he is the only user in DeSCal who can
specify other user(s) with whom he would like to share the events administered by him. For
fault-tolerance, availability and crash recovery, DeSCal is based on full replication of data at
each user site. This implies that each user sites stores the whole copy of the shared calendar.
For more in-dept detail of DeSCal, see Chapter 2 or refer to [AIR11].
Problem Statement
As the whole copy of the shared calendar is replicated at each user site in DeSCal; in absence
of access control, all users can ‘Read’, ‘Delete’ and ‘Edit’ any shared calendar event which they
would like to, even if some events are not shared with them by their administrators/owners.
However, in general, it is not practical for a user to share all his calendar events with everyone
in the group. For instance, a user may have some private events which he might not like to
1In this report, sharing of an calendar event may correspond to allow other users for any subset of <Read,
Delete and Edit> operations on shared calendar event.
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Figure 1.1: Direct access to shared calendar information in persistent storage
share with anyone in the group or he may have some secret group events which he might want
to share only with some selected user(s) in the group.
To prevent unauthorized actions2 on shared calendar events by illegal users of DeSCal, an
access control mechanism is needed. DeSCal provides an access control mechanism but it deals
only with ‘Delete’ and ‘Edit’ unauthorized operations i.e., a user can’t delete and edit the events
for which he is not authorized. This access control model adopted by DeSCal is principally
based on [ICR09], a flexible access control model for distributed collaborative editors which
doesn’t deal with ‘Read’ access control. However, DeSCal takes care of ‘Read’ access control on
application level i.e., a user can’t read the events for which he is not authorized using DeSCal.
This is accomplished by making visible to the user only the shared calendar events for which he
is authorized to read. However, this is not enough to enforce ‘Read’ access control on shared
calendar events as these events are always stored in plain-text and the whole copy of the shared
calendar is replicated at each user site. A user can read these unauthorized events for ‘Read’
access without using DeSCal (See Figure 1.1). For example, a user can read the shared calendar
events directly by reading the whole copy of the shared calendar stored locally in persistent
storage (hard-disk) or reading the shared calendar events at network endpoint when they arrive
from other user sites, thereby, losing/sacrificing the confidentiality of users’ calendar events
which is possibly an important concern for a user.
Motivation
The motivation behind this work is to make DeSCal secure by providing both confidentiality
and integrity to the shared calendar events. The access control model already employed by
2In this report, an action may correspond to any subset of <Read, Delete and Edit> operations on shared
calendar event.
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DeSCal preserves the integrity of the replicated shared calendar events by restricting illegal
users to ‘Delete’ and ‘Edit’ the events for which they are not authorized. In this report, we
plan to address the issue of providing confidentiality to replicated shared calendar events by
controlling the ‘Read’ access on shared calendar events i.e., a user should only be able to read
the events for which he is authorized. However, only securing the replicated shared calendar
events is not enough to ensure confidentiality and integrity of shared calendar events if the
network communication between users is not secure. Both providing confidentiality to users’
calendar events and securing the communication between users, had been mentioned as the
future work in the original paper of DeSCal [AIR11] and we plan to address these issues here.
Challenges
These security issues must be addressed in such a way that DeSCal doesn’t lose its characteristic
features like fault-tolerance, crash recovery, availability of data. DeSCal must be able to survive
crashes, it must be fault-tolerant and data must be replicated at each user site for high availabil-
ity. In DeSCal, ‘Read’ access control on replicated shared calendar events must be decentralized
i.e., there is no central server where shared calendar events can be stored and then, an access
control policy is enforced on this centrally stored data. Decentralization leads to new challenges
like self-organization, service availability and security. Moreover, in DeSCal, the group of users
is dynamic i.e., users leave or join the group in an arbitrary manner at any point of time.
Contribution
Our contribution consists of (i) proposing a required security framework for DeSCal and (ii)
implementing it on top of iPhone OS implementation of DeSCal [AIR11]. The proposed security
framework provides (i) confidentiality to replicated shared calendar events and (ii) secures the
communication between users in DeSCal. It is achieved using standard cryptographic protocols
in the field of computer security. This proposed security framework preserves all characteristic
features of DeSCal.
This report is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we detail the desired features of a shared calendar and briefly present a Decen-
tralized Shared Calendar (DeSCal) [AIR11]. Chapter 3 establishes the security requirements
of DeSCal whereas Chapter 4 presents the state of the art of securing replicated data in a de-
centralized distributed context. Security framework is proposed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6
describes its implementation on top of iPhone OS implementation of DeSCal. In the end, we
present the summary of our work and possible directions of future work.
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Background
This chapter essentially brings forward what a reader has to know before proceeding to read this
report any further. It investigates the desired features of a shared calendar, and then, briefly
introduces DeSCal [AIR11]. In case a reader already knows the usefulness of a decentralized
shared calendar and is familiar about DeSCal, this chapter can exceptionally be skipped solely
based on reader’s own judgment (or decision). In any case, we strongly recommend reading this
chapter to everyone as DeSCal is presented here in a better, different and compact manner.
2.1 Desired Features of Shared Calendars
The shared calendar must not depend on a third party.
Shared calendars based on a third party central server, for instance, Google Calendar [GCa],
prevents users to create a dynamic Ad-Hoc group as users always have to communicate through
this central server. Moreover, there is no direct communication between users and they need
to have a constant connection to this third party central servers (e.g. an Internet connection
to connect to Google Servers to use Google Calendar). Also, using third-party central server
to store the shared calendar information, reduces availability of the data as the data has to
be fetched from or stored at remote central server when modified by users. Above all, using a
third party for sharing calendar events may also lead to sacrificing the confidentiality of these
users’ calendar events which is possibly an important concern for a user. See Figure 2.1 to
better understand the disadvantages behind using a third party to store the shared calendar
information.
An access control mechanism is needed on shared calendar events.
It may not always be appropriate for a user to share all his calendar events with other users in
the group. A user may have some secret events which he would like to share only with some
selected user(s) in the group, not with everyone. To deal with this aspect of shared calendar,
there must be some access control mechanism on shared calendar events. Moreover, access
control on shared calendar events must be dynamic, i.e. users should be able to change the
access rights on their shared calendar events at any point of time after the creation of an event
(unlike the case where a user specifies access control for an event only at the time of creation or
insertion of an event).
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Figure 2.1: Disadvantages behind using a third party to store the shared calendar information
Eventual Consistency and High Concurrency
Eventual consistency helps concurrency and parallelism as there is no need to wait for all of
the copies to be synchronized when updating shared calendar. Any number of users should be
able to concurrently modify the shared calendar (by inserting, deleting and editing the events in
the shared calendar) but users must eventually be able to see a converged view of all replicated
shared calendar copies. Eventual consistency of the replicas is desired; otherwise, diverged
replicas may result into a wrong insertion, deletion and edition of the events in the replicated
shared calendar copies.
Scalability
The shared calendar must be dynamic in the sense that users may join or leave the application
at any point of time during its runtime.
High responsiveness
The shared calendar must be as responsive as a personal calendar i.e. users should have an
illusion that they are alone while using the shared calendar.
2.2 DeSCal
A decentralized shared calendar, DeSCal, complying with all these desired features of a shared
calendar has been proposed in [AIR11].
2.2.1 Is DeSCal the first one of its kind?
Shared calendars are common nowadays but none of them is decentralized and self-configurable
except DeSCal. Google Calendar [GCa] is a shared calendar application by Google but it needs
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a constant connection to Google servers and a prior registration for its shared calendar service
by each user. Consequently, it can’t be used over local Wi-Fi networks or over blue-tooth in an
organization where mobile users can leave or join the group in an Ad-Hoc manner. This gives
DeSCal an edge over its centralized counterparts.
A user can use mobile version of DeSCal and join or leave the group in an Ad-Hoc manner.
There exists mobile version of Google Calendar which is made for small screen and also, mobile
phone’s built-in calendars can be synchronized with Google Calendar when users are away from
their desk but the need to depend on a third party (i.e. a constant connection to Google Servers)
never goes away.
Zimbra platform calendar application [Zim] enables users to share their events with other
users in a group but again, this is centralized and a server needs to be run before using this
application. While using Zimbra platform calendar application, one can run his own server in
an organization without depending on a third party but this central server becomes a single
point of failure for the shared calendar. Furthermore, centralized server prevents users to create
Ad-Hoc group as users need prior knowledge of central server to run the application.
Both Google Calendar and Zimbra platform calendar application use CalDAV (Calendar ex-
tensions for Distributed Authoring and Versioning) [Cal] which is an Internet standard allowing a
client to access scheduling information on a remote central server. To the best of our knowledge,
all other shared calendars depends on a central entity to run and manage itself.
2.2.2 A Deployment Scenario of DeSCal
A research team in a research organization usually consists of a scientific and administrative
leader, other members of the team and an administrative assistant. All members of the team
can run an instance of DeSCal to keep track of their personal events and also, to share some
group events with others. They can hide their personal events by not sharing these events with
others. For group events involving two or more persons, one can create the event and share
it with other members who are concerned by it. If few members of the team are in a group
meeting, others can know this by just having a look on DeSCal. In addition, it is more intuitive
for a team leader to share some administrative events with delete and/or edit right with the
administrative assistant of the team so that extra hassle of communication can be avoided to
deal with administrative tasks.
At the same time, we agree with the fact that this can also be easily done using a centralized
shared calendar like Google Calendar but members of this research team can find DeSCal more
appropriate if any one or all of the following possible scenarios are true:
• The central entity in the centralized shared calendar is not owned by the organization itself
and also, this organization has no connectivity with the outside network of a third party
on which centralized shared calendar depends. For example, this research team can’t use
Google Calendar if they don’t have Internet connection as it is managed by a third party.
• Members of the team want to keep their calendar events confidential i.e. they don’t want
to disclose their calendar events with this third party (for instance, Google in case they
use Google Calendar) who provides shared calendar service.
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• A team member meets someone while going for lunch or for a coffee and he wants to
share some events with this person. This can be done instantly without any overhead like
registering for shared calendar service of a third party; just by allowing other person to
join the group and sharing only some specific events which this team member wants to
share.
2.2.3 Ingredients of DeSCal
Here, we briefly present the elementary entities of DeSCal as it is crucial to understand the
proposed security framework.
Shared Calendar
The shared calendar can be modeled by the list abstract data type where each element of the
list is an event [ICR09].
Definition 1. [Cooperative Operations]. The shared calendar state can be altered by the
following set of cooperative operations: (i) Ins(p, e) where p is the insertion position in the
shared calendar and e the event to be inserted at p; (ii) Del(p, e) which deletes the event e at
position p; (iii) Up(p, e, e
′
) which replaces the event e at position p by the new event e
′
.
Policy
The access control model in DeSCal is based on authorization policy or access control policy3
where each user defines a policy to specify access control rules for the events created
by him. A policy is a list of authorizations or rules; sometimes, also called authorization list.
A policy specifies the operations a user can execute on shared calendar events. Three sets are
used for specifying policies, namely:
1. S is the set of subjects where a subject is a user.
2. O is the set of objects where an object is an event.
3. R is the set of access rights. Each right is associated with an operation that a user can
perform on shared calendar events. Thus, we consider the right of reading an event (rR),
inserting an event(iR), deleting an event (dR) and updating an event (uR).
As each user is authorized to insert an event in the shared calendar, the insertion right (iR) is
not dealt and so, DeSCal must deal with dynamic changes of rR, dR and uR rights.
Definition 2. [Policy]. A policy is a function that maps a set of subjects and a set of objects
to a set of signed rights. We denote this function by P : P(S) × P(O) → P(R) × {+,–}, where
P(S), P(O) and P(R) are the power sets of subjects, objects and rights respectively. The sign
“+” represents a right attribution and the sign “–” represents a right revocation.
A policy P is represented as an indexed list of authorizations (or rules). Each authorization
Pi is a quadruple 〈Si, Oi, Ri, ωi〉 where Si ⊆S, Oi⊆O, Ri⊆R and ωi ∈ {+,–}. An authorization
is said positive (resp. negative) when ω = + (resp. ω = –). Negative authorizations are just used
to accelerate the checking process. When a user wants to perform an operation, DeSCal needs
3In the rest of the report, we only write ‘policy’ instead of writing ‘access control policy’ or ‘authorization
policy’ each time.
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Figure 2.2: DeSCal design modules
to check whether the user is allowed to perform this operation or not. DeSCal uses a first-match
semantics for this: when an operation o is generated, it checks o against its authorizations one
by one, starting from the first authorization and stopping when it reaches the first authorization
l that matches o. If no matching authorization is found, o is rejected, i.e. that operation can’t
be executed on the shared calendar.
Definition 3. [Administrative Operations]. The state of a policy is represented by a list of
authorizations 〈P〉. A user can alter the state of his policy by the following set of administra-
tive operations: AddAuth(p, l)/DelAuth(p, l) to add/remove authorization l at position p. An
administrative operation r is called restrictive iff r = AddAuth(p, l) and l is negative or r =
DelAuth(p, l).
2.2.4 DeSCal modules
The design of DeSCal is composed of four well-separated conceptual modules described below
(See Figure 2.2):
Coordination
The job of coordination module is to handle the concurrent updates on the shared calendar
by different users. This has to be done in a decentralized and scalable manner, i.e. without
requiring a central server and where users can leave or join the group at any point of time. It
is this module which is responsible for ensuring the same converged and consistent copy of the
shared calendar at each participating node in all cases. It directly interacts with the local copy
of the shared calendar and thereby, is responsible for maintaining its consistency. This module
is based on [Imi09], a coordination module for distributed collaborative editors.
Access Control
This module is to control access on the shared calendar events so that a user is only able to
access the events for which he is authorized. Also, the access control mechanism provided by
this module is dynamic, decentralized and scalable. Here, dynamic access control on calendar
events means a user can change access control for his shared calendar events at any point of
time after the creation of an event.
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P2P/Ad-Hoc Network
The role of this module is to maintain a local knowledge of the network infrastructure. It’s the
responsibility of this layer to provide Peer-to-Peer distributed architecture services to DeSCal
for any kind of network like Wireless Ad-Hoc networks, Short range communication (e.g. blue-
tooth), LAN, Internet or Managed infrastructure Wireless LAN.
User Interface
It enables users to take actions on the shared calendar. However, this module can’t directly
change the state of the shared calendar without interacting with the coordination and access
control module. An action taken by the user on this module has to pass through access control
module. If this action is authorized by access control module, it is passed to coordination module
to change the state of the shared calendar and to deal with consistency issues.
2.2.5 DeSCal Workflow
Below, we present the sequence of major steps taken by DeSCal to better understand it while
hiding the complexity behind these steps:
1. When a user manipulates an event in the local copy of the shared calendar by generating a
cooperative operation, this operation will be granted or denied by only checking the local
copy of the policy of the administrator of that particular event.
2. Once granted and executed, the local cooperative operation is then broad-casted to other
users. On reception of this operation at remote user sites, a user has to check whether the
remote operation is authorized with respect to his locally stored admin log4 of the event’s
administrator before executing them on his local copy of the shared calendar.
3. When a user modifies his local policy by adding or removing authorizations, he sends these
modifications, i.e. administrative operations, to other users in order to update their local
copies of the policy.
2.2.6 What does a DeSCal user site need to store?
In DeSCal, all users are authorized to insert a new event and a user who inserts an event is
the administrator of that event. An administrator can take any action on the shared calendar
event created by him and he is the only one who can decide if some other user in the group
is allowed to take these actions on this shared calendar event. An administrator exerts this
authority on his shared calendar events by specifying authorizations or rules in his policy for
the events administered by him. As each user is the administrator of the events created by him,
there are as many policies as the number of users. Users can modify an event in shared calendar
with respect to the locally stored policy of the administrator of that event.
Shared Calendar and Cooperative Log. DeSCal keeps a copy of the shared calendar at
each user site to improve performance. Users can perform updates on his local copy of the shared
calendar independently and then, these locally executed updates are transmitted to other users
in the group. One has to note here that reception of these locally executed updates at other user
4Short form of administrative log. Administrative log of user u1 stores all administrative requests generated
by him.
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Figure 2.3: Storage at u1’s local site
site is not guaranteed to be in the same order as they are executed locally at their corresponding
local sites because of network latency variation, computer resources etc. Therefore, DeSCal
needs a decentralized mechanism which can handle the coordination of concurrent updates by
different users on shared calendar. The mechanism used in [AIR11] keeps track of both local
and remote calendar update requests by storing them in a log called cooperative log. This log
helps in maintaining the consistency of the shared calendar and it needs to be stored at each
user site.
Policies and Admin Logs. To deal with latency and dynamic access changes, it uses an
optimistic access control technique (inspired from [ICR09]) in such a way that enforcement of
authorizations is retroactive. Access control is the ability to grant or deny the manipulation
of information by someone. A data structure (policy in our case) is used to store all access
rights. This policy is checked whenever the controlling-access is started. We store the policy
at each user site because high responsiveness can be lost if every update must be authorized
by some authorization coming from a distant central server. DeSCal follows the access control
model described in [ICR09] but this access control model doesn’t satisfy all the requirements of
DeSCal. The model proposed in [ICR09] is single-administrator whereas in DeSCal, each user
is the administrator of the events created by him. The single administrator model, proposed in
[ICR09], keeps a copy of the admin log containing all administrative requests and policy at each
user site. DeSCal extends this model to make it a multi-administrator model where each user
has his own 1) policy for the events created by him and 2) admin log to store his administrative
requests. Eventually, this requires each user to keep a copy of the policy and admin log of all
other users in the group.
To sum up, we illustrate what a user site stores by presenting an example scenario (See Figure
2.3). Suppose, there are three users in DeSCal at a given time t: u1, u2 and u3, and they insert
concurrently two, one and three events respectively. After insertion of these events, each user
will have the same copy of the shared calendar. In this case, events e1 and e6 are inserted by
user u1; e2, e3 and e5 are inserted by u3 and e4 is inserted by u2. Cooperative log at each user
site will contain all the cooperative requests generated locally and received from remote user
sites. User u1 will store the policies and admin logs of each user including himself (i.e., u1, u2
and u3) and admin log stores all the administrative requests generated by the corresponding
user. In this case, u1 will store the following at his local site : policies and admin log of u1, u2
and u3, whole copy of the shared calendar and his cooperative log.
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Security Requirements of DeSCal
Securing DeSCal had been left as the future work in the original paper of the DeSCal [AIR11]
and because of absence of security measures, DeSCal remains vulnerable to all kind of attacks.
Here, in this chapter, we list what is necessary to make DeSCal secure while at the same time,
not loosing its unique features like fault-tolerance, crash recovery, availability, dynamic access
control. Our focus is primarily on analyzing and precisely establish the security requirements
for DeSCal.
Mainly, below two tasks were left as the future work in the original paper of the DeSCal
[AIR11] and we will deal with these in this report.
3.1 Providing confidentiality to replicated shared calendar events
The whole copy of the shared calendar is replicated at each user site in DeSCal but a user should
be able to read, delete or edit only the events for which he is authorized. For shared calendar
events not to be deleted/edited by unauthorized users, DeSCal [AIR11] already employs an
access control module, which essentially ensures the integrity of the replicated shared calendar
events. However, this access control model can’t prevent users to read the shared calendar events
for which they are not authorized. It is of no use to provide confidentiality to shared calendar
events as in DeSCal, the whole shared calendar is replicated at each user site in plain-text. As a
matter of fact, a user can read this locally stored shared calendar state directly without using the
application (or outside the scope of the application) even if DeSCal generates a view of ‘Read’
access authorized calendar events for the user to hide the unauthorized shared calendar events
for ‘Read’ access. This leads to loosing the confidentiality of shared calendar events. So, here,
our primary goal is to provide confidentiality to shared calendar events i.e., only authorized users
can read the shared calendar events. We highlight here that we don’t deal with the integrity
of shared calendar events as it has been already dealt by access control module employed in
DeSCal.
Below, we discuss informally what additional data needs to be secured apart from the repli-
cated shared calendar and why this data needs to be secured. As it is clearly evident from the
fact that DeSCal is pure P2P, we need to store the copy of the shared calendar at each user
site. In addition to storing the shared calendar, as described in Chapter 2, a user in DeSCal
also needs to store following four entities at each user site:
• Shared Calendar
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• Policies of each user
• Admin logs of each user and
• Cooperative log
Storing local copy of all these data leads to high availability of data, thereby, also increasing
the responsiveness and performance of the DeSCal. While providing confidentiality to shared
calendar events, care must be taken as a cooperative log stores all local and remote cooperative
requests. It requires us to provide confidentiality to shared calendar events stored as cooperative
operations in cooperative requests. Policies and admin logs of all other users stored at each user
site don’t need to be secured in DeSCal as they (policies and admin logs) contain the access
control information on shared calendar events. Reading these copies of the policies and admin
logs can’t help a user to get any significant information about shared calendar events except the
unique event ids of events. Even if a user changes these locally stored copies of admin logs and
policies of other users, he will end up having his own shared calendar copy diverged from other
shared calendar copies stored at various other user sites. Other users won’t be affected by it
because they will simply ignore his unauthorized actions on shared calendar events once they
will be received at their corresponding local sites. On reception of his unauthorized actions at
remote user sites, these actions can be checked against remote users’ local copies of the polices
and admin logs; and can be rejected if not allowed according to their locally stored policies or
admin logs.
3.2 Securing the communication between users
Besides confidentiality to replicated shared calendar events, DeSCal [AIR11] doesn’t provide any
security measures to secure the messages exchanged among users. The network communication
between users must be secured with respect to all basic security properties like confidentiality,
integrity, non-repudiation, replay attack. It is an important fact to point out that in DeSCal, a
number of users form a group to participate in the shared calendar but the group communication
security mechanisms are not suitable for DeSCal. At first glance, it might seem a little bit
awkward but in DeSCal, the messages broadcast are not intended to be read by everyone in
the group; as opposed to DeSCal, it is actually the case in group communication. It is due to
the fact that, unlike in group communication where all users are equally privileged, users in
DeSCal have different rights. In DeSCal, for each event, only a subset of users in the group are
authorized to read. A message broadcast to all users in DeSCal should not be read by the users
who are not authorized to read it while it is in network transmission. For example, if a user
u1 wants only user u2 to read his event, then, user u3 (also, part of the group) should not be
able to read this event. Therefore, when this network message is broadcast to all the users in
the group through a communication channel, it needs to be secured in such a way that user u3
(who belongs to this group) should also not be able to access it. Here, in DeSCal, a broadcast
network message has to be secured from unauthorized users in shared calendar group of DeSCal
as well as outsiders while it is in transit.
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Today, P2P systems are rapidly growing in use because of their inherent nature to provide
1) scalability, 2) equal participation of peers and 3) fault-tolerance. These systems are fault-
tolerant as 1) there is no single point of failure and 2) they replicate the data at each participating
node. However, with the absence of a central authority, security of 1) replicated data and 2)
messages exchanged between peers, is a challenging task. Further, P2P systems can be classified
broadly in three groups depending on their purpose of use: 1) Content distribution 2) Distributed
computation and 3) Collaborative application. Likewise, security requirements for these different
classes also differ from each other. We start by doing a literature survey of security aspects in
collaborative applications and of course, in other decentralized shared calendars which is a
variety of decentralized collaborative environment.
4.1 Security mechanisms adopted in other shared calendars and
decentralized collaborative environments.
To the best of our knowledge, there doesn’t exist other decentralized shared calendars where a
literature survey of their security aspects can be done. Besides, securing a centralized shared
calendar is totally different and is not relevant as it involves only securing the data stored at a
single central entity. Though, as a matter of fact, DeSCal is fundamentally a type of decentralized
collaborative environment where a group of users take part and share their calendar events by
working on the same copy of the replicated shared calendar. Consequently, our first natural
direction of literature survey is the field of decentralized collaborative environment. We explored
few works [AD06], [Liu08], [LWR09], [AIS+05], [Ada06] and [GJO+06] for access control in the
field of decentralized collaborative environment. However, we found out that all these works are
based on trust i.e. they use trust-based access control (TBAC). Nonetheless, trust-based access
control is not suitable to DeSCal as the requirements of DeSCal include immediate enforcement
of user’s access control policy. In DeSCal, once a user revokes or shares his event(s) with some
selected user(s), this must be followed/performed by the application strictly and immediately.
DeSCal can’t tolerate the time taken to build the trust between users which is normally the case
in trust-based access control systems. Moreover, trust-based access control mechanisms enforce
access control based on trust and not according to the user’s access control policy.
We again remind here that DeSCal already employs an access control mechanism for preserving
the integrity of the shared calendar (by restricting unauthorized ‘Delete’ and ‘Edit’ operations
on shared calendar events) and this access control mechanism is based on strict access control
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according to user’s policy and not based on trust. However, this access control mechanism
doesn’t deal with ‘Read’ access control on shared calendar events loosing the confidentiality of
users’ calendar events and here, in this report, our primary goal is to provide confidentiality to
users’ calendar events.
4.2 Securing replicated data.
As outlined above, trust-based access control is not suitable for DeSCal. Regardless, we don’t
limit ourselves only to works done for access control in the field of collaborative environments.
We realize that the problem of providing confidentiality to replicated data seamlessly exists in
other kinds of decentralized distributed systems which are based on replication of data. In this
progression, first, we investigate the revolutionary work done by Herlihy and Tyger in their paper
[HT88] for securing the replicated data. This paper describes a mechanism to make replicated
data secure using 1) Quorum consensus replication [Her86] and 2) Shamir’s secret sharing algo-
rithm [Sha79]. Here, securing replicated data means preserving its confidentiality and integrity.
Authors describe protocols employing private and public key encryption to preserve the confi-
dentiality (secrecy) and integrity of the data. However, this work preserves the confidentiality of
the data only against a passive adversary and not against an active adversary while in DeSCal,
confidentiality of the data must be preserved against an active adversary. Here, active adversary
means the owner of a user site where data is stored whereas passive adversary can be anyone
else who tries to read/modify the contents of the data. One has to note here that, in [HT88],
encrypted data is stored in replicated form in a quorum, while the key used for encrypting this
data is stored using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [Sha79].
Policy-based access control for weakly consistent replication systems is proposed in [WRT09].
Authors describe the design and implementation of this access control model within Cimbiosys
replication framework [RRT+09]. They describe this access control system for replicated data
by presenting a real-world scenario. In this access control model, replicas have a version number
associated with each update of the replica. Access control on these replicas is limited in the
sense that revocation claims are applied only to those versions newer than the associated version
vector. For example, if read right is revoked at version v for a peer p by the owner, p will not be
able to read newer versions but still, he will be able to read v or versions older than v. However,
in DeSCal, if an administrator revokes ‘Read’ right for his events at time t for a peer p, then,
even concurrent modifications at the same time t at other user sites must not be read by user p
i.e. in DeSCal, administrative operations are given more priority than cooperative operations.
Not to mention, in the proposed access control model in [WRT09], data is weakly consistent
because consistency of replicated data depends on time interval between two synchronization
operations provided by replication framework whereas DeSCal is based on eventual consistency.
In an another work [PTHCR08], secure content access and replication in pure P2P networks,
security aspects required in content sharing application are dealt with and a new security mech-
anism is proposed which suits best to content sharing applications.. Authors deal with the
security aspects like content authentication and content integrity checking in content sharing
applications. Security mechanism is provided in a distributed fashion (i.e. without requiring a
central authority) using Pathak and Iftode’s protocol [PI06] for public key authentication. The
authentication of public key is very important to associate a user with a public key i.e., public-
key authentication ensures that a user who claims to have a public-private key pair actually
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possesses the private key corresponding to that public key. The proposed protocol is based on
associating content with security labels. Appropriate user clearances are required to access this
labeled content. It is similar to PGP in the sense that content and authorization certificates are
issued by the users. However, as opposed to PGP, it doesn’t rely on certificate directories for
the distribution of certificates. In any case, this mechanism deals only with the integrity of data
by preventing malicious users changing the content of the published data and confidentiality of
the data is not dealt.
4.3 Secrecy by splitting.
For security and fault-tolerance, another set of works mainly rely on either Shamir Secret Shar-
ing Algorithm [Sha79] or Rabin’s Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) [Rab89]. A different
(and somewhat less efficient) perfect secret sharing scheme [Bla79] was also proposed by Blakley
in the same year as Shamir’s. However, Shamir’s scheme is used more frequently than Blakley’s
in the works based on perfect secret sharing schemes (possibly because of its efficiency advan-
tage). As opposed to this, in our opinion, both Shamir’s and Blakley’s schemes can be used
interchangeably when it comes to use a perfect secret sharing scheme (if efficiency factor can be
ignored). Below, we briefly describe Shamir’s secret sharing and Rabin’s information dispersal
schemes respectively for readability and completeness.
Shamir Secret Sharing Algorithm. It divides data D into n pieces in such a way that D
is easily reconstructible from any k pieces, but even complete knowledge of k-1 pieces reveals
absolutely no information about D. It can be used to divide the secret data D (preferably, a
cryptographic key) into n pieces where pieces are stored in a distributed fashion. Secrecy of
the data is preserved due to the fact that any lesser than k pieces of data don’t reveal any
information about the secret data D. Likewise, fault-tolerance is achieved because of the fact
that any k out of n pieces can be used to reconstruct the data D.
Rabin’s Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA). It breaks a file F of length L into n
pieces, each of length L/m, so that every m pieces suffice for reconstructing F. Dispersal and
reconstruction are computationally efficient. The sum of the lengths is (n/m) × L. Since n/m
can be chosen to be close to 1, it is space efficient. It has numerous applications to secure and
reliable storage of information.
Shamir Secret Sharing Algorithm can only be used for the data which is (or can be made) a
number, thereby, having an upper limit on the length of the data. It was originally designed for
the construction of robust key management schemes for cryptographic systems that can function
securely and reliably even when misfortune destroy half the pieces and security breaches expose
all but one of the remaining pieces. As opposed to this, Rabin’s IDA can be used for any
arbitrary length of data. Shamir’s and Rabin’s techniques achieve a different level of security
with different performance and storage requirements. If the original file is b bytes in size and the
file is to be divided into n pieces such that any k pieces suffice to reconstruct the file, Shamir’s
scheme requires a total of n×b bytes, while Rabin’s requires (n×b)/k. Shamir’s requires more
computation as well. To compensate for the extra storage and computation, Shamir’s scheme
is more secure, achieving information theoretic security. Rabin’s security is far less, and would
be unacceptable in many environments. However, in 1993, Krawczyk proposed a blending of
Rabin and Shamir for improved security, by encrypting the data with a key-based encryption
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algorithm, and then dispersing the encrypted data with an IDA and the key with a secret sharing
scheme [Kra94]. This is called Secret Sharing Made Short (SSMS).
Below are some works which provide secrecy to the data by either splitting the data itself or
the cryptographic key which is previously used to encrypt this data.
In this context, we start by investigating an approach for fault tolerant and secure data storage
in collaborative work environments [SB05]. As, in collaborative work environments, it can be
expected that there will be changes in the list of users authorized to read or update the sensitive
data. When using the traditional approach, changes in the access list will require re-encrypting
the stored data with a new cryptographic key, which may be cumbersome. For fine grained
access list management, each file or document stored would require a unique key. The number
of keys could then become large and unmanageable. To avoid such expensive operations during
changes in the access list, authors of [SB05] propose to store the data itself using secret sharing
techniques. However, it is not clear for us by reading this paper that how do authors really
enforce these access list changes on the stored data (for example, addition of a new user in
access list). Moreover, unlike in DeSCal, they store data at distributed data storage servers
whereas in DeSCal, data must be fully replicated at each user site.
In [AAEM09], authors aim to outsource data in such a way that outsourced data is guaranteed
to be secure. In this paper, authors describe scalable privacy preserving algorithms for data
outsourcing. Instead of encryption, authors use distribution of data on multiple data provider
sites and information theoretically proven Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm as the basis for
privacy preserving outsourcing. However, Shamir’s shared secret method can’t be used
in DeSCal because:
• Firstly, as already explained, Shamir’s secret sharing scheme applies only to the data which
is (or can be made) a number, thereby, restricting the size of the secret data on which it
can applied. It is frequently applied to provide secrecy to cryptographic keys which are
generally small in size.
• Secondly, in DeSCal, users are dynamic i.e. users may join or leave the group at any point
of time and hence, requiring the threshold of Shamir’s shared secret method to be changed
accordingly. Moreover, this change in threshold must be performed without requiring the
dealer (dealer is the one who breaks the secret data into pieces and distributes to others)
because in DeSCal, an administrator of the event might not be present in the group when
a new user joins the group or an existing user leaves the group.
Several works [TW], [SWP04], [BCSV94], [MMT01] exists in literature to change the thresh-
old parameter of the Shamir’s shared secret method with or without requiring the dealer. Nev-
ertheless, [TW] and [SWP04] only investigates the problem of increasing (not decreasing) the
threshold parameter of the Shamir’s scheme. Furthermore, in actual, [TW] assumes that thresh-
old t is beyond 160 which is, in any case, not practical for DeSCal as it is not practical to have
number of users 160 or more in a shared calendar group of DeSCal. [MMT01] again addresses the
problem of changing the threshold parameter of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme along with extra
verification, in which the combiner can verify whether the pooled shares are correct or not and
also, the participants can verify whether the share given by the dealer is correct or not. But, in
this scheme, the threshold can be changed only plural times to the values determined in advance.
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[BCSV94] is specially designed for future threshold modification and is based on advanced share
technique. Per contra, dynamic secret sharing schemes based on advanced share techniques can’t
be used in DeSCal as the group of users is extremely dynamic and can’t be predicted at a certain
point of time (even the number of users in DeSCal can’t be predicted in advance). Apart from
the works done for changing the threshold of Shamir’s secret sharing method, in [WXYX07],
a new dynamic threshold secret sharing scheme from Bilinear Maps is proposed. However, it
needs a public bulletin board, under the control of the dealer, to publish auxiliary information.
In [Cac95], an another work which uses bulletin board, a new construction for computationally
secure secret sharing schemes with general access structures is proposed. This scheme provides
the capability to share multiple secrets and to dynamically add participants on-line, without
having to re-distribute new shares secretly to the current participants.
In [GKLL], a system, vanish is proposed to increase the privacy of data by self-destructing
it after a user-specified time. This system seeks to protect the privacy of past, archived data –
such as copies of emails maintained by an email provider - against accidental, malicious and legal
attacks. Specifically, they wish to ensure that all copies of certain data become unreadable after a
user-specified time. It is a new idea to destroy unwanted data after a specific time-limit and helps
increase data privacy. They combine shamir’s secret key concept and DHTs in a nice way leading
to develop this system. For security of data without using encryption techniques, as described
above, a lot of works split and store the data across various physical locations. POTSHARDS
[SG07] is a system designed to provide secure long-term archival storage to address the new
challenges and new security threats posed by archives that must securely preserve data for
decades or longer. This archival storage system, POTSHARDS, provides long-term security for
data with very long lifetimes without using encryption. Secrecy is achieved by using provably
secure secret splitting and spreading the resulting shares across separately-managed archives.
However, shared secret splitting methods can’t be used in DeSCal to share a secret as the group
of users in DeScal is highly dynamic.
Dispersing data across multiple sites yields a variety of obvious benefits, such as availability,
proximity and reliability. Less obviously, it enables security to be achieved without relying
on encryption keys. Standard approaches to dispersal either achieve very high security with
correspondingly high computational and storage costs, or low security with lower costs. AONT-
RS [RP11], a new dispersal scheme is proposed which blends an All-Or-Nothing Transform
[Riv97] with Reed-Solomon coding to achieve hight security with low computational and storage
costs. It uses Rabin’s IDA and enriches it in two ways: first, by employing a variant of Rivest’s
All-or-Nothing Transform as a preprocessing pass over the data and second, by employing a
systematic erasure code instead of non-systematic one. Unlike SSMS [Kra94], it enriches the
security of Rabin’s IDA without secret sharing. But again, we can’t use Rabin’s IDA in DeSCal
due to below reasons. In DeSCal, when a new user joins the group, the administrator of the
event must send him his share but at the time of joining the group, the administrator may not
be present in the group. Also, a new user must contact all the existing users in the group to get
his shares of the shared calendar events at the time of joining the group which is not practical.
In some other work [JAV08], a privacy service for DHTs is proposed by applying the principles
of Hippocratic database to P2P systems to enforce purpose-based privacy which prevents privacy
violation by prohibiting malicious data access. However, data is not replicated and is stored
only at a single data provider site.
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In this chapter, our primary goal is to propose a decentralized security mechanism which can
fulfill all security requirements of DeSCal. The proposed security framework satisfies all the
security requirements of DeSCal while at the same time, not loosing DeSCal’s characteristic
features. This novel security framework makes use of well-established cryptographic protocols
in the field of computer security.
Things to be taken care of while proposing the security framework for DeSCal
(Security Framework Design Requirements).
Both providing confidentiality to a user’s calendar events and full replication insists DeSCal to
store the shared calendar events in some non-readable (encrypted) form where a user can read
only the events for which he is authorized. However, just storing these shared calendar events
in a non-readable form doesn’t make any sense. In the original paper of DeSCal [AIR11], the
motivation behind full replication was to increase the availability of the data, ensuring recovery
of the data in case of crash and to make DeSCal fault-tolerant. Therefore, it is very important to
store this non-readable in such a way that DeSCal doesn’t loose it’s all above mentioned salient
features.
Fault-tolerance is the ability of DeSCal to continue operating properly when a user site crashes.
In addition, DeSCal has the ability to survive the crash of a user site i.e. if a user site is crashed,
this user can join the group and participate again in the same manner as it was participating
before the crash by restoring the whole state of the shared calendar. A term ‘maintainability’ was
also coined for this later aspect of DeSCal. Availability of data ensures that the shared calendar
events are readily available to a user site when they are needed i.e. if a user wants to access
the shared calendar events for any subset of ‘Read’, ‘Delete’ or ‘Edit’ operations, these shared
calendar events must be retrieved as quickly as possible. For immediate retrieval to increase the
availability of the data, these shared calendar events must be stored at each user site. Storing
these shared calendar events at each user site ensures that these events are present and ready for
use all the time. Furthermore, for these stored shared calendar events to be available all the time,
the security framework used to provide confidentiality must also be functioning correctly all the
time. Ensuring availability also involves preventing denial-of-service attacks. Therefore, while
proposing a security framework (‘Read’ access control on shared calendar events and securing
the communication) for DeSCal, one must take extremely care that these salient features of
DeSCal are retained.
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Here, we would also like to point out that security framework must essentially be designed
on top of DeSCal [AIR11] where coordination and access control models already employed by
DeSCal are not changed substantially. They must remain as intact as possible and can have
merely very minor modifications. We remind here that these coordination and access control
models used in DeSCal are mainly based on coordination and access control models proposed
in [Imi09] and [ICR09] for decentralized distributed collaborative editors respectively.
DeSCal is based on broadcast group communication i.e., it doesn’t need to send specific
messages to different users. And, coordination and access control modules already employed
by DeSCal are designed keeping in mind this fact. Thereupon, another design requirement of
security framework for DeSCal includes preserving this broadcast group communication.
In the end, we would like to emphasize the fact that providing the required security mecha-
nisms for DeSCal in such an environment is very challenging task and has never been dealt by
the research community in this field so far to the best of our knowledge. The challenges are:
1. ‘Read’ access control must be decentralized i.e., there is no central server where we can
store the data and then, enforce an access control policy on this centrally stored data.
2. DeSCal must be able to survive crashes; it must be fault-tolerant and data must be repli-
cated at each user site for high availability
3. Users in DeSCal are dynamic i.e. a user can leave or join the group at any point of time.
4. For securing the communication between users in DeSCal, standard group communication
security mechanisms can’t be used despite the fact that users in DeSCal form shared
calendar groups. It is described in Chapter 3 why this group communication security
mechanisms are not appropriate for DeSCal.
5.1 Our proposed security framework
To meet all security requirements of DeSCal, we propose here a security framework complying
with all the design requirements mentioned above. This security framework uses basic security
protocols in such a way that it makes DeSCal secure and robust. It uses public key cryptography
where each user is linked with a public key. Generally, to build a secure system of multiple users,
it is very important to identify them in some way. Here, we identify a user by his public key. To
associate a user (or user id) with a public key correctly, authentication of users’ public keys is
required and this first step is decisive for the correct working of rest of the security framework.
As well, the authentication of users’ public keys must be done in a decentralized way without
using trusted third parties (TTPs). For this, a byzantine fault-tolerant public key authentication
for pure Peer-to-Peer systems is proposed in [PI06] by Pathak and Iftode which suits best to
our needs. For readability and completeness, we describe this protocol in brief below.
Pathak and Iftode’s protocol
Pathak and Iftode [PI06] apply the ideas presented in the Byzantine Generals Problem [LSP82]
for providing public key authentication in pure P2P systems, where generally one cannot assume
the existence of a PKI. They postulate that a correct authentication depends on an honest
majority of a particular subgroup of the peers’ community, labeled “trusted group”. However,
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Figure 5.1: Authentication protocol example: A peer A is authenticated by B using its trusted
peers. D is a malicious peer that tries to prevent authentication of A.
in this kind of systems, an authenticated peer could create multiple fake identities and could act
maliciously in the future (Sybil attack [Dou02]). For this reason, the classification of the rest
of the community maintained by each node has to be proactive and periodically flushed. Thus,
honest members from trusted groups are used to provide a functionality similar to that of a CA
(certification authority) through a consensus procedure.
The authentication protocol (see Figure 5.1, figure taken from the original paper [PI06])
consists of four phases: admission request, challenge response, distributed authentication and
Byzantine agreement. The protocol begins when Bob runs into a newly discovered peer, Alice,
with an unauthenticated public key (KA), and then asks for the key to a subgroup of its trusted
members, in order to verify its authenticity. Each notified peer challenges Alice by sending a
random nonce encrypted with Alice’s supposed public key (sent by Bob) in the signed challenge
message. Alice will be able to return the recovered nonce in a signed response message (if and
only if she holds the corresponding private key (K−1A )). Each challenger waits for an application
specific timeout, and if a correct response is received, he gets a proof of possession for KA. All
announced peers send their proofs of possession to Bob.
If all peers are honest, then there will be consensus and Bob will get the authentication result.
Note that Alice or some of the peers can be detected as malicious or faulty if some votes differ.
In this case, Bob first verifies if Alice is malicious by sending her the request message containing
the proof. Alice must respond with all the challenge messages received and her respective
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responses. If Alice can prove that she is not malicious, then some of the peers must be; in that
situation, Bob must communicate a Byzantine fault to the group, which will send the Byzantine
agreement message to others. All these transmitted messages have timestamps, source and
destination identifiers, and digital signatures. Finally, successful authentication moves a peer to
the trusted group, whereas encountered malicious peers are moved to the untrusted group.
For further details, we refer the reader to the original paper in [PI06].
Notations used
1. Symmetric key: A symmetric key used for event e is denoted as Ke.
2. Public/Private key pair: Public/private key pair of a user u is denoted as Ku and K
−1
u
respectively.
3. Symmetric cryptography: Symmetric encryption and decryption of an event e using
key Ke is denoted as EKe(e) and DKe(e) respectively.
4. Asymmetric cryptography: Asymmetric encryption and decryption of message ’m’
using public/private key pair of user u is denoted as {m}Ku and {m}K−1u respectively.
5.1.1 Description
Here, we detail our proposed security framework and describe how it is enforced on top of
coordination and access control model already employed by DeSCal [AIR11].
We present our security framework by describing the mechanism to be followed with respect
to all possible happenings during the whole life cycle of DeSCal.
These possible happenings can be categorized based on their type:
1. User-generated happenings: This type of happenings are generated by a user by tak-
ing an action either on the shared calendar or on policy (by generating cooperative and
administrative operations respectively).
2. System-wide happenings: A new user joins or an existing user leaves DeSCal. An
existing user may disconnect for a while and then, may connect back i.e., goes off-line and
then, comes on-line again.
1. User-generated happenings
A user can take various cooperative and administrative operations at any point of time during
DeSCal’s lifetime. We describe the steps taken to enforce our security framework for each of
these operations.
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Inserting a new event. As all users in DeSCal are allowed to insert a new event. So, insertion
of a new event is not checked against the local copy of the policy before it’s execution at locally
stored copy of the shared calendar. Once it’s inserted in the local copy of the shared calendar,
a cooperative request of insertion type is generated and broadcast to all other users in DeSCal.
This cooperative request comprises the locally inserted new event which is to be inserted at
all other copies of the shared calendar. Likewise, on reception of this cooperative request at
other user sites, this new event is always allowed to be executed on remote copies of the shared
calendar as all users are authorized to insert a new event in the shared calendar.
However, adding security framework requires the cooperative request to store the newly in-
serted event in some non-readable form which if broadcast, only authorized users can read.
Extreme care has to be taken to construct this non-readable form keeping in mind all the secu-
rity requirements of DeSCal and design requirements of security framework are satisfied.
When a user inserts a new event ‘e’ in the shared calendar, DeSCal needs to generate a new
symmetric key ‘Ke’ corresponding to this newly created event. Next, the newly created event ‘e’
is encrypted by this symmetric key ‘Ke’ using a symmetric key encryption algorithm. Side-by-
side, this symmetric key is first encrypted using the public key of the owner (who inserted this
event ‘e’) and also, using public keys of other authorized users for ‘Read’ access to this event.
All these encrypted forms constitutes a new form of event (which we call e′, See 5.1). This new
form e′ can only be read by authorized users when broadcast in the group.
e′ = EKe(e), {Ke}KOwner , {Ke}KAuthUser1 , {Ke}KAuthUser2 , .... (5.1)
Just replacing the event i.e., ‘e’ by ‘e′’, in insert operation of broadcast cooperative request
helps us in keeping the coordination and access control models almost untouched while propos-
ing this new security mechanism for insertion of an event. Also, it is very important to note
here that it is e′ which is stored in cooperative request, thereby, requiring no security mechanism
for securing cooperative log. Also, confidentiality to the broadcast cooperative request is au-
tomatically provided during network transmission as no one (both inside or outside the group)
except authorized users can read these events. We will describe later how other basic security
properties are preserved for network communication.
This new form of event ‘e′’ consists of 1) encrypted event and 2) the symmetric key used
for encryption of the event, encrypted separately with public key of the owner and all other
authorized users. On reception of this broadcast cooperative request at remote user sites, only
authorized users are to recover the event ‘e’ from ‘e′’. An authorized user can do this by getting
the symmetric key used for the encryption of the event by decrypting the encrypted symmetric
key with his private key and then, decrypting the event using this symmetric key. This ensures
that only authorized users can get the event ‘e’ back but not other users.
Practically, it is possible that at the time of creation of an event, no other user is authorized
to read this event and in this case, e′ will take the following form (See 5.2):
e′ = EKe(e), {Ke}KOwner (5.2)
In 5.2, it can be easily seen that owner can always get the event ‘e’ back in case his site crashes;
just by demanding the whole state of the shared calendar from any nearby user.
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Deleting an existing event. When a user wants to delete an event in the shared calendar, it
is checked against his local policy if he is authorized to do so or not. If authorized, this event is
deleted from the local copy of the shared calendar and then, a cooperative request is generated
which is to be broadcast to all other users in the group. On reception, this cooperative request
is checked against the admin log and if authorized, the event in the local copy of the shared
calendar is deleted. It must be noted that events are always stored in encrypted form ‘e′’ in
the shared calendar and a view (the events for which he is authorized to read) is generated for
the user from this encrypted calendar. In case of deletion, nothing extra has to be done with
respect to our proposed security framework.
Editing an existing event. It is the job of the access control model already employed by
DeSCal to ensure that an unauthorized user can’t edit an existing event in the shared calendar.
Edition of an event is same as inserting a new event from the perspective of our proposed security
framework except the fact that editing an existing event doesn’t always necessitate to generate
a new symmetric key as is the case in inserting a new event. If the edition of the event by some
authorized user is immediately after a revocation of ‘Read’ right to some user(s) by the owner,
the editor must generate a new symmetric key because the set of authorized user(s) for ‘Read’
right has changed after this revocation operation. This new symmetric key is used for encrypting
the edited event and the symmetric key is encrypted by the public key of the owner and new set
of authorized user(s). It results into a new form of edited event e′ where only authorized users
can read the event in plain-text if it is broadcast to all other users in the group.
Also, we would like to point out that encryption of symmetric key with the public key of the
owner and all authorized user is not needed to be computed and broadcast each time a user edits
an event. Only if there is an immediate revocation of ‘Read’ right to a set of user(s) before the
edition of an event, we need to generate this whole new form of event e′ (See 5.1) corresponding
to these newly set of authorized user(s) by generating a new symmetric key. Otherwise, we only
need to compute and broadcast the encrypted edited event with the same symmetric key which
is already being used for this event.
Granting ‘Read’ right. Only the owner of an event can grant a ‘Read’ right to a set of
user(s). When the owner grants ‘Read’ right to a set of user(s), an administrative operation is
generated after changing the locally stored policy. This administrative operation is broadcast
to all other users in the group to make the change effective at policies stored at all other remote
user sites. However, just broadcasting this administrative operation to grant ‘Read’ access to a
set of user(s) on this event only enables them to change their locally stored policy. These ‘Read’
right granted user(s) still can’t get access to the event in plain-text. For this, the owner must
send the symmetric key used for this event encrypted with the public key of all granted user(s)
along with this administrative operation. Suppose, the owner grants ‘Read’ access to two users
u1 and u2 for some event ‘e’. Symmetric key used for encrypting event ‘e’ is denoted by Ke. In
this case, the owner must send information ‘i ’ (See 5.6) along with the administrative operation.
i = {Ke}Ku1 , {Ke}Ku2 (5.3)
By doing this, the users who are granted ‘Read’ access can first decrypt the symmetric key
which is being used for encrypting this event. This can be done by decrypting their corre-
sponding encrypted part of the symmetric key in the received information ‘i ’ (along with the
23
Chapter 5. Proposed Security Framework
administrative operation) using their private key. Once the symmetric key is obtained, one can
use it to decrypt the encrypted event.
For the problem of how to broadcast this extra information ‘i ’ with the administrative opera-
tion, we must look for a solution which minimizes changes in DeSCal’s coordination and access
control models. For the sake of this, we choose to send information ‘i ’ embedded in the specified
rule of this grant administrative operation. For each ‘Read’ right granted event, there must be
an associated list which stores the symmetric key used for that event encrypted with the public
key of all authorized user(s) in the same order as specified in that rule. It is easy to retrieve
this information as each grant operation always has these keys encrypted with the ’Read’ access
granted users’ public keys associated with the identifiers of the events in the rule. This requires
us to make minor changes in the rule specified in the access control model already employed by
DeSCal.
On reception of this information ‘i ’ embedded in the rule, it is stored in the replicated en-
crypted shared calendar copy corresponding to the events in the rule. Once the event ‘e’ is
retrieved from ‘e′’ at newly ‘Read’ access authorized users, DeSCal changes the view for these
users by making this event available to read. We want to emphasize here on the fact that ac-
cess control on shared calendar events in DeSCal is immediate and it strictly obeys the policy
specified by the owner of the shared calendar events.
Revoking ‘Read’ right. In case of revocation, apart from sending the revocation adminis-
tration request to all other users in the group, nothing has to be done by the owner from the
perspective of our proposed security framework. Nevertheless, calendar view for these ‘Read’
access revoked users is changed to hide the events for which ‘Read’ access is revoked. All con-
current cooperative operations concerned by the revocation administrative operations are not
allowed, thereby, maintaining high priority of administrative operations i.e., once the ‘Read’
access to a set of events is revoked by the owner for a set of users, these users can no more read
further updates to these events.
Later, if ‘Read’ access revoked event is modified by an authorized user, he constructs e′ with
respect to new set of authorized users. The set of authorized user has been changed by receiving
the‘Read’ right revocation administrative operation. A new symmetric key has to be generated
in this case (by the authorized user who modifies this event) and this event must be encrypted
with this newly generated symmetric key so that these revoked ‘Read’ right users can no more
access the event in plain-text using old symmetric key. A user can no more see the modifications
of an event as soon as ‘Read’ right is revoked for a user.
2. System-wide happenings
Beyond any doubt, we need to consider all the possible happenings (apart from the user-
generated happenings) in DeSCal while proposing this security framework for DeSCal. As a
security framework is as strong as its weakest part, it must work correctly in all cases; which
if not, may cause the system to halt and making it unavailable. Next, we look into the cases
where users joins or leave shared calendar group in an arbitrary manner and then, we examine
what happens when a user goes off-line and comes on-line again immediately. We illustrate how
these cases are actually dealt with the proposed security framework.
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A new user joins the shared calendar group. When a new user joins the shared calendar
group after his public-key authentication, he contacts a nearby user with a request to join the
shared calendar group. The contacted user sends his whole shared calendar state in persistent
storage to this newly arrived user. As the whole shared calendar state in persistent storage is
stored in encrypted form and no symmetric key corresponding to the shared calendar events is
encrypted using the public key of this new user, he can’t decrypt the encrypted events in the
shared calendar state. Once the shared calendar state is retrieved by this newly arrived user, he
can participate in the same manner as other existing users in the DeSCal.
An existing user leaves the shared calendar group. When a user leaves the shared
calendar group, no extra care has to be taken with respect to the proposed security framework.
Even DeSCal is silent to this happening and it’s operation remains unaffected.
A user goes off-line and then, comes on-line again. When a user goes off-line, it is the
same as a user leaves the shared calendar group. However, when a previous user come on-line
at a later point of time, he retrieves the whole shared calendar state from a nearby user. From
this retrieved encrypted shared calendar state, this user can get access to the events for which
he is authorized (both his own events and the events of other users for which he is authorized
to read).
How Fault-tolerance is achieved in DeSCal?
By design, DeSCal is fault-tolerant because it continues operating properly even if other user sites
crashes or malfunctions. Also, our security framework is totally decentralized and is independent
of other user sites’ behavior, thereby, not losing its default feature by design. A user site running
an instance of DeSCal has no effect if some other user sites crash or start behaving improperly.
Surviving a crash in DeSCal.
If a user site is crashed, the shared calendar state can be restored back. This property of DeSCal
is unique and it is this property of DeSCal which makes it a favorite choice among users when
they need to use either a shared or personal calendar application. After the crash at a user site,
a user can again join the group asking the whole copy of the shared calendar. He can retrieve
back all the events owned by him as well as the events for which he is authorized to ‘Read’. The
only information which a user must not lose is his private key and the whole shared calendar
state can be restored back.
How availability of data is ensured?
We need to ensure that availability of data is not lost while adding this security framework on
top of DeSCal. It is one among the most important characteristics of the DeSCal. If we lose
availability of data, we lose the interest of full replication. However, at the cost of security,
one may have to compromise a little bit with the availability because, to provide confidentiality
to users’ shared calendar events, these events must be stored in some non-readable form. In
DeSCal, our need is to protect the confidentiality of the shared calendar events but at the same
time, we also need to store this information at each user site. If we don’t store the shared
calendar events at unauthorized user sites, our other features of DeSCal like fault-tolerance,
crash recovery and availability of data will be lost. To keep all these features preserved along
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with providing confidentiality to users’ calendar events, we need to store the shared calendar
events in some non-readable form at unauthorized user sites. As seen above, fault-tolerance
and crash recovery is achieved by DeSCal without any compromise and next, we show that
availability of shared calendar events can also be ensured without any compromise.
In our proposed security framework, all shared calendar events are stored and broadcast in
encrypted form such that a user can get access to the events in plain-text only if he is authorized
to read them. As a user stores all the shared calendar events locally, the availability of data
is ensured in the case when he can access them in plain-text. However, the shared calendar
events where a user can’t get access in plain-text, the issue of availability should arise. Such a
case arises only when an owner of an event grants ‘Read’ right to some previously unauthorized
user(s). When the owner grants ‘Read’ right to a user, this user must be able to access the event
immediately. It is the case in our proposed security framework as the administrative operation
granting ‘Read’ right for an event also contains the information which is needed to retrieve
the event in plain-text. For all other cooperative and administrative operations, availability is
already ensured as the whole shared calendar state is replicated at each user site.
5.1.2 Concurrency Issues
DeSCal already deals with all concurrency issues that arises from concurrent administrative
and cooperative operations, though, new concurrency issues may arise with the addition of new
‘Read’ right administrative operation in our proposed security framework. In this section, first,
we investigate the operations where concurrency issues may arise with respect to ‘Read’ right
administrative operation and then, we justify them with a slight modification of coordination
and access control models already employed by DeSCal.
First of all, it is obvious that ‘Read’ right administrative operation for an event ‘e’ can’t be
concurrent to administrative operations of other types for this event. This is because adminis-
trative operations are generated by a single user (i.e., only by the owner of an event) and always
ordered.
Also, ‘Read’ right administrative operation can only be specified after creating/inserting an
event by the owner and can’t be concurrent to cooperative operation of insertion type. Only
an owner can insert an event in the shared calendar and generate ‘Read’ right administrative
operation on the events administered by him. This implies that there can’t be a case where two
different users concurrently generate a cooperative operation of insertion type and ‘Read’ right
administrative operation for the same event.
Cooperative operation of deletion type and ‘Read’ right administrative operation for the same
event can be concurrent as an authorized user can delete the event whereas at the same time,
administrator of that event can generate a ‘Read’ right administrative operation. However,
below, we investigate if this concurrency of two operations can cause some problems or not.
A cooperative operation of deletion type for an event ‘e’ corresponds to simply deleting this
event from the shared calendar and it doesn’t make any sense if an event is readable or not at
a particular user site at the time of deletion of this event. In actual, an event to be deleted is
identified by the position of that event in the shared calendar (and not by the event itself) and
this leads to having no concurrency issues in case of these two concurrent operations.
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Figure 5.2: Necessity of undo in case of concurrent right revocation and edit operations
Finally, as an event may be edited by an authorized user at the same time when the owner
of that event generates a ‘Read’ right administrative operation, it is evident that concurrent
cooperative operation of update type and ‘Read’ right administrative operation can be generated.
There are concurrency issues in this case which bothers correct working of DeSCal and next, we
investigate these issues further for ‘Read’ right grant and revocation administrative operations
separately.
‘Read’ right revocation and ‘Edit’ concurrent operations.
Suppose there are three users: u1, u2 and u3. An authorized user u1 edits an event while the
user u3 (administrator) of that event revokes ‘Read’ right for user u2 (See Figure ??). As user
u1 is unknown of the concurrent revocation of ‘Read’ right to user u2, he generates the new form
f ′ of edited event f as shown in 5.4.
f ′ = EKf (f), {Kf}Kf3 , {Kf}Kf1 , {Kf}Ku2 (5.4)
The generated cooperative operation corresponding to this edit operation consists of this
new form f ′ and is broadcast to other users after editing the event in locally stored shared
calendar at user site u1. As f
′ contains the symmetric key used to encrypt this edited event f,
this implies that edited event f by user u1 can be read by u2, however, it should not be the case
as in DeSCal, administrative operations are given higher priority than cooperative operations
in case two cooperative and administrative operations are concurrent.
The access control model already employed by DeSCal is based on an ‘UNDO’ mechanism
in case of concurrent restrictive administrative operations and the solution to this above prob-
lem also consists in undoing the edit operation by user u1, thereby, enforcing administrator’s
‘Read’ right revocation operation. For the sake of reader’s information, the access control model
employed by DeSCal is inspired from [ICR09], a flexible access control model for distributed
collaborative editors. We refer the reader to [ICR09] to better understand this ‘UNDO’ mecha-
nism.
‘Read’ right grant and ‘Edit’ concurrent operations.
In case of ‘Read’ right grant administrative operation, the administrator of an event sends the
administrative request which also contains the information using which an authorized user can
decrypt back the encrypted event. It seems like perfectly okay at first glance in case of ‘Read’
right grant administrative operation but, we present below a case where the problem can occur.
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The problem can occur if a user edits an event5 and the administrator of this event concurrently
attributes ‘Read’ right to a set of user(s) (See Figure 5.3). In this figure, user u4 (owner of event
‘e’) revokes read right to u2 for the event ‘e’ who was previously authorized to read this event.
Next, user u4 attributes read right for event ‘e’ to user u3 and concurrently, user u1 (who is
authorized to edit the event ‘e’) edits event ‘e’. User u1 generates a new symmetric key as there
was an immediate revocation for this event before this edition and encrypts this edited event ‘f ’
with this new key. Also, he encrypts the symmetric key used for encrypting the event with the
public key of the owner u4 and other users who are authorized to read this event (in this case,
no other users apart from him (u4) is authorized). It results into a new form f
′ ((See 5.5)) of
this edited event f .
f ′ = EKf (f), {Kf}Ku4 , {Kf}Ku1 (5.5)
Later, user u1 broadcasts the generated cooperative request containing this new form f
′
of edited event f. At user site u4, the concurrent ‘Read’ right grant administrative operation
modifies the local copy of the policy and then, generated administrative request is broadcast.
This administrative request also contains the information ‘i ’ (See 5.6) so that newly ‘Read’ right
granted user u3 can decrypt the encrypted event, by first getting the symmetric key used for
encrypting the event and then, using this symmetric key to decrypt the event.
i = {Ke}Ku3 (5.6)
Suppose the cooperative request generated by user u1 reaches at user site u3 first and later,
u3 receives the ‘Read’ right grant administrative request. When user u3 receives the ‘Read’ right
grant administrative request, he will try to use the received key Ke to decrypt the encrypted
event, but he won’t be able to able to do so as the stored encrypted form is modified. Again, the
solution to this problem is to undo the concurrent edit operations with respect to ‘Read’ right
grant administrative operations. In general, a cooperative request of update type is undone in
case of concurrent ‘Read’ right administrative operation.
5.2 An illustrating example
To better understand our proposed security framework for ‘Read’ access control on shared
calendar events, we present a scenario (See Figure 5.4) comprising of three users: u1, u2 and u3.
Each user simultaneously inserts two events in the shared calendar and it is the responsibility
of the coordination module to maintain the consistency of the shared calendar. After all, each
user will have the same converged, consistent copy of the shared calendar. Here, in our setting,
events e1 and e5 are created by user u1; e3 and e6 are created by u2 whereas e2 and e4 are created
by u3. User u1 authorizes u2 and u3 to read his events e1 and e5 respectively; u2 authorizes u1
and u3 to read his events e3 and e6 respectively whereas u3 authorizes u1 and u2 to read his
events e2 and e4 respectively. Here, we highlight that each user has the same state of the shared
calendar but a user is only able to read the events for which he is authorized. For example, at
each user site, event e1 is stored in some encrypted form (See 5.7)
Encrypted form of e1 = EKe1 (e1), {Ke1}Ku1 , {Ke1}Ku2 (5.7)
5With the assumption that this edit is followed by a revocation; thereby, necessitating a change of symmetric
key to encrypt the edited event.
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Figure 5.3: Necessity of undo in case of concurrent right attribution and edit operations
In this encrypted form, along with encrypted event (EKe1 (e1)) using a symmetric key (Ke1),
this symmetric key used to encrypt the event e1 is encrypted using the public keys Ku1 and Ku2
of users u1 and u2 respectively. This implies that only owner u1 and authorized user u2 can read
this event e1 stored in this encrypted form at each user site. Moreover, this event e1 is stored
at each user site in such a manner that all three salient features of DeSCal (fault-tolerance,
availability and crash recovery) are satisfied. It is easily evident that event e1 can be retrieved
back by user u1 and u1 by asking the copy of it from u3.
New user u4 joins the group.
When a new user u4 joins the group and contacts a nearby user u2 to get the whole shared
calendar state. Irrespective of having the whole shared calendar state, this new user u4 can’t
retrieve any event in plain-text as he is not authorized to read them. After getting the whole
shared calendar state, this new user u4 can take part in the shared calendar in the same manner
as other existing users u1, u2 and u3.
User site u1 is crashed.
If user site u1 is crashed, u1 will not lose his shared calendar events as long as he has his
private key somewhere safe. Moreover, u1 will not only retrieve his own shared calendar events
but also, other users’ events for which he is authorized to read; effectively, restoring the whole
shared calendar state back. In this case, user u1 will use his private key to decrypt the symmetric
keys corresponding to the events for which he is the owner or he is authorized to read. Even a
user can use DeSCal as his personal calendar by not sharing his events with other users in the
group and can take the benefit of crash recovery.
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Figure 5.4: Example illustrating our proposed security framework
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5.3 Securing the communication between users
We would like to point out that securing the communication between users was also left as future
work in the original paper of DeSCal [AIR11]. Here, we highlight that our proposed security
framework for ‘Read’ access control automatically takes care of confidentiality of the shared
calendar events while they are in transit. This is due to the fact that events are always sent in
encrypted form where the symmetric key used for encrypting the event is encrypted only with the
public key of the users who are authorized to read this event, thereby, allowing only authorized
users (inside or outside the group) to decrypt back the encrypted event (by decrypting the
encrypted symmetric key using their private key). No one else apart from authorized users can
read the encrypted event by controlling the communication channel between users of DeSCal.
To avoid replay attack, a network message is associated with a number (randomly chosen for
the first message and then, incrementing it with each network message sent). The receiver can
detect a replay message if the counter value is repeated. To ensure integrity, authenticity and
non-repudiation, the network message is first hashed6 to produce a short digest that is then
signed (using the private key of the sender).
For illustration, we denote a message (e.g., cooperative or administrative request or state of
the calendar) by ‘m’ which is to be broadcast by user ui. To avoid replay attack, we propose to
associate a randomly generated counter with message ‘m’ and we denote it by ‘m′’ (See 5.8).
m′ = {m, counter} (5.8)
Next, to guarantee integrity, authenticity and non repudiation of message ‘m′’, it is first
hashed to produce a short digest that is then signed with private key (K−1ui ) of user ui. It is
denoted by sig (See 5.9). In the end, m′′ (See 5.9) is broadcast to other users in the shared
calendar group.
m′′ = {m′, sig} where sig = {hash(m′)}
K−1ui
(5.9)
5.4 Discussion
In this proposed security framework, a new symmetric key has to be generated by the owner
for each new event created in the shared calendar. It increases the computational cost while
inserting a new event. Also, the symmetric key used for encrypting an event has to be stored
encrypted with public key of the owner and all authorized users at each user site. It leads to
extra storage requirements. However, our proposed solution is not expensive as the data to
be encrypted (shared calendar events) is normally not huge. Moreover, this solution preserves
all characteristic features of DeSCal (i.e. fault-tolerance, crash recovery, availability) while
providing security to DeSCal at the same time. We believe that one has to compromise a little
bit of computational cost and storage wastage at the cost of preserving characteristic features
of DeSCal.
6A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic procedure that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns
a fixed-size bit string, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that an intentional or accidental change to the data
will change the hash value.
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Chapter 6
Implementation on iPhone OS
Our proposed security framework has been implemented on top of iPhone OS implementation of
DeSCal system. For details on implementation of DeSCal on iphone OS, please, refer to [AIR11].
At the time of writing this report, byzantine fault-tolerant public key authentication [PI06]
by Pathak and Iftode is not implemented. However, we plan to implement it in near future
and one can ensure that it’s implementable as the authors of [PI06] has already implemented
this protocol as a standalone library to make it available to a variety of applications. In the
current implementation of the security framework, a user sends his public key to all other users
in DeSCal when he joins the group. Also, when a new user joins the group, existing users in the
group send this newly arrived user their public key. This will lead to a user in DeSCal possessing
the public key of all other users. As a user possesses the public key of all other users in DeSCal
which is actually necessary for our proposed security framework to work, it starts operating as
explained in Chapter 5.
The current implementation of our security framework on iPhone OS uses RSA algorithm for
asymmetric encryption and public/private key pair of size 1024 bits. For symmetric encryption,
it uses AES-128.
Figure 6.1 contains four snapshots of our iPhone OS implementation of DeSCal (Calendar,
Event Detail, Policy and Available Peers view from left to right).
For demonstration, let’s take an example where a user wants to give ‘Read ’ right to a user
named ‘Michael’ for his events: <Event 1> and <Event 2> where <Event 1> = {Title:Concert
Location:Stanislas Date & Time:24 June 2011 09:00:04 PM} and <Event 2> = {Title:See Tigran
Location:A201 Date & Time:15 July 2011 10:25:04 AM}. So, in this case, we will have to select
‘Michael’ from the list of users, ‘Event 1’ and ‘Event 2’ from the list of events, ‘Read ’ from the
list of rights (Read, Delete & Edit) and ‘Right Attribution’ from the list of permissions(Right
Attribution & Right Revocation). See Figure 6.2 to have a look on how this rule selection is
performed in iPhone OS implementation of DeSCal.
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Figure 6.1: Calendar, Event Detail, Policy and Available Peers view in iPhone OS implementa-
tion of DeSCal
Figure 6.2: Selection of various attributes to insert a new rule in policy in iPhone OS imple-
mentation
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Conclusions and Possible Directions
of Future Work
1 Conclusions
Securing DeSCal had been mentioned as future work in the original paper of DeSCal [AIR11] and
we dealt with it here. We have designed and implemented a security framework for DeSCal which
ensures confidentiality and integrity of shared calendar events. Also, the network communication
between users is secured with respect to other basic security properties like non-repudiation,
message authentication, replay attack. The proposed security framework uses byzantine fault
tolerant public key authentication in pure Peer-to-Peer systems [PI06] by Pathak and Iftode for
users’ public-key authentication. It makes use of both symmetric and asymmetric encryption in
such a way that all security requirements of DeSCal are satisfied.
2 Possible Directions of Future Work
First of all, we plan to formally analyze and verify our proposed security framework using
tools like AVISPA [ABB+05] which automatically perform the verification of security protocols.
Inspired form [Cal], another dimension of formalizing our work is to specify the communication
protocol in a decentralized manner as specified in [Cal] for centralized shared calendars.
Also, DeSCal requires a user-authentication mechanism where users are allowed to join the
shared calendar group based on some predefined policy. Currently, DeSCal allows everyone to
join in an Ad-Hoc manner and participate in the shared calendar. However, this may cause a
problem for other users in DeSCal if a malicious user joins the shared calendar group and starts
inserting useless events just to overload the events in the shared calendar. We also plan to fix
this problem in future.
Apart from this, we plan to look for more efficient solution which can satisfy the security
requirements of DeSCal while preserving its characteristic features. In this direction, we plan
to investigate few works described below and ascertain if these works can be adapted to meet
security demands of DeSCal.
ID-based encryption (or Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)) is an important primitive of ID-
based cryptography. ID-based encryption was proposed by Adi Shamir in 1984. As such it is a
type of public-key encryption in which the public key of a user is some unique information about
the identity of the user (e.g. a user’s email address). In 2004, Sahai and Waters introduce a new
type of IBE scheme in their paper [SW04] that they call Fuzzy IBE. In Fuzzy IBE they view an
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identity as a set of descriptive attributes. A Fuzzy IBE scheme allows for a private key for an
identity, ω, to decrypt a cipher-text encrypted with an identity, ω′, if and only if the identities
ω and ω′ are close to each other as measured by the matching of their descriptive attributes
on a specific type of distance metric. The motivation behind developing Fuzzy IBE was to
utilize its error-tolerance property to enable encryption using biometric inputs as identities,
which inherently have some noise each time they are sampled. Later, a new cryptosystem for
fine-grained sharing of encrypted data is developed in [GPSW06] where cipher-texts are labeled
with sets of attributes and private keys are associated with access structures that control which
cipher-text a user is able to decrypt. The Attribute-Based Encryption systems used attributes
to describe the encrypted data and built policies into user’s keys; while in [BSW07], attributes
are used to describe a user’s credentials, and a party encrypting data determines a policy for
who can decrypt. [BSW07] is conceptually similar to Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). As
[BSW07] presents a system for realizing complex access control on encrypted data and it is
conceptually similar to RBAC, we plan to investigate further this work if it can be used more
efficiently to satisfy the security requirements of DeSCal.
Also, Broadcast encryption [FN94] is the cryptographic problem of encrypting broadcast con-
tent (e.g. TV programs) in such a way that only qualified users (e.g. subscribers who’ve paid
their fees) can decrypt the content. In broadcast encryption, a central broadcast site can broad-
cast secure transmissions to an arbitrary set of recipients while minimizing key management
related transmissions. This paper presents several schemes that allow a center to broadcast a
secret to any subset of privileged users out of a universe of size n so that coalitions of k users not
in the privileged set cannot learn the secret. The most interesting scheme requires every user to
store O(k logk logn) keys and the center to broadcast O(k2 log2klog(1/p)) messages regardless
of the size of the privileged set. Several solutions exist offering various trade-offs between the
increase in the size of the broadcast, the number of keys that each user needs to store, and
the feasibility of an unqualified user or a collusion of unqualified users being able to decrypt
the content. Our future work consists of analyzing the technique of broadcast encryption if it
can be suitable to the security needs of DeSCal and if yes, make a comparison between it and
our proposed security framework. This comparison will be done based on various factors like
performance, key management techniques, storage cost, message broadcast size.
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Re´sume´
Nous proposons un protocole de se´curite´ pour des agendas partage´s dont la gestion de donne´es
est comple`tement de´centralise´e. Dans ce protocole, nous assurons a` la fois (i) la confidentialite´ du
contenu re´plique´ et (ii) la se´curite´ de communication entre les utilisateurs. Comme nous utilisons
une re´plication comple`te de donne´es, notre protocole pre´serve toutes les caracte´ristiques d’une
telle re´plication, a` savoir : la tole´rance aux pannes et la reprise apre`s panne. Pour valider notre
solution, nous avons imple´mente´ un prototype sur des mobiles tournant sous le syste`me iPhone
OS.
Mots-cle´s: Se´curite´, Re´plication, Confidentialite´, Inte´grite´, De´centralisation, Disponibilite´,
Tole´rance aux pannes, Reprise sur incident
Abstract
We propose a security framework for Decentralized Shared Calendar. The proposed security
framework provides confidentiality to replicated shared calendar events and secures the commu-
nication between users. It is designed in such a way that DeSCal preserves all of its characteristic
features like fault-tolerance, crash recovery, availability and dynamic access control. It has been
implemented on iPhone OS.
Keywords: Security, Replication, Confidentiality, Integrity, Decentralization, Availability, Fault-
tolerance, Crash Recovery

